In global economic circles, one question keeps returning with greater urgency: Has the United States become too powerful or has the rest of the West simply become too reliant?
For both the UK and Europe, the answer increasingly looks like the latter. Whether through trade flows, capital markets, or regulatory influence, the transatlantic economic relationship has become asymmetrical - and potentially unsustainable.
The US is not just a partner in global finance and commerce; it is the centre of gravity. And in times of volatility, that gravitational pull becomes harder to resist - even when the direction of travel may no longer align with UK or European interests.
Recent events have laid bare just how deep the imbalance runs. From Brussels to London, policymakers and investors alike were caught off-guard by US-led peace overtures to Russia that bypassed Ukraine’s European allies. But the surprise wasn’t just diplomatic, it was financial.
Any sudden change in US policy now carries ripple effects for British and European markets. From currency fluctuations to energy pricing, global markets move on Washington’s word. That’s not necessarily a problem until the UK or the EU is on the receiving end of policies they didn’t shape but can’t afford to ignore.
However, this isn’t new. The UK, for example, was stung by US protectionist moves in recent times - from steel tariffs under Trump to ongoing disputes over digital services taxes. Despite post-Brexit ambitions to expand trade globally, the US remains one of the UK's largest markets and a key regulatory influence.
The result? Exposure without leverage.
The UK and EU have long viewed deep trade ties with the US as an economic strength. But recent trends suggest that dependency brings growing downside risk.
The UK, for instance, counts the US as one of its largest export markets - significantly ahead of any single European counterpart. Yet when Washington moves to raise tariffs or subsidise domestic industry, as seen with the Inflation Reduction Act, Britain has little leverage to influence outcomes.
The same is true in the EU, where recent trade “deals” have often amounted to acquiescence rather than negotiation. What once felt like strategic alignment now increasingly resembles strategic exposure.
There is one solution: begin reducing that exposure - not through disengagement or protectionism, but by rebalancing economic priorities. For UK investors and policymakers, that could mean placing greater focus on intra-Commonwealth trade, Asia-Pacific partnerships, or high-growth emerging markets.
In financial terms, the West’s dependency on the US is even more pronounced. London may still be a global financial hub, but when it comes to raising capital, listing companies, or scaling start-ups, the US - and particularly the Nasdaq - remains the ultimate destination.
For Europe and especially the UK, this represents a silent but significant form of economic erosion. British companies increasingly seek IPOs in New York. UK pension funds and institutional investors hold disproportionate exposure to US tech stocks. Then we have the S&P 500, when it moves this tends to impact the FTSE, but not necessarily the other way around.
This level of interdependence is not necessarily problematic in a stable political climate. However, the US is in a more volatile era - one where industrial policy is becoming partisan and capital flows more weaponised.
UK markets must ask: how resilient are we if that tide turns? Could a shift in US tax or trade policy impact British valuations? What happens when geopolitical tensions begin to shape financial regulation, as we’ve already seen with US scrutiny of Chinese listings and tech platforms?
Both the UK and the EU have often spoken of “sovereign capability” and “regulatory autonomy”, but when it comes to markets, money and trade, reality bites.
Financial sovereignty cannot exist without investment infrastructure. Strategic autonomy cannot happen while relying on another nation’s market access, capital base, and demand engine. At some point, diversification must be more than a talking point.
That doesn’t mean cutting ties with the US. However, it does mean preparing for a future where relying on Washington’s goodwill is no longer a viable strategy - especially for financial systems and economies looking to chart their own course.
The UK is not alone in this, but it may be uniquely exposed: outside the EU, but deeply linked to US markets; committed to global trade, but struggling to rebalance. If the US shifts even more inward - economically or politically - London will feel the chill.
The question isn’t whether the US has too much power. The question is whether the UK and EU have left themselves with too little room to manoeuvre. And if so, the real reckoning won’t come from across the Atlantic; it will come from our own lack of preparedness.
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